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1 Introduction
The present paper belongs to the rapidly growing new open-economy macroeco-
nomics (NOEM) literature.1 Our objective is to revisit, within this sticky-price
optimizing approach and explicitly accounting for monetary uncertainty in gen-
eral equilibrium, the classic subject of exchange rate and trade determination.
In particular, we here reconsider in a fully-symmetric NOEM context and un-
der alternative price-setting conventions the question whether the exchange-rate
regime matters for international trade. Comparing consumer’s currency pricing
(CCP) vs. producer’s currency pricing (PCP), we are able to answer in what
sense this is the case. In a self-contained theoretical analysis that explicitly
parallels a CCP to a PCP model version, we derive from first (micro-)principles
important (macro-)outcomes. Some of them are really novel while the positive
and normative implications of other have been debated for long, but largely
within ad-hoc frameworks in the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch tradition.
More precisely, this paper builds on the stochastic representative agent set-
up under CCP proposed in Bacchetta and van Wincoop (1998, 2000 a). As
noted by these authors, their ”benchmark monetary model” — together with the
similar ones developed in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1998, 2000) under PCP, we would
add — is intended as a starting point in modern research on monetary policy in
open economies. Its main contribution, which we pursue here as well, is to re-
cast traditional welfare comparisons of exchange-rate arrangements in a general
equilibrium setting that explicitly considers the role of macroeconomic uncer-
tainty. We thus explore Bacchetta and van Wincoop’s (2000 a) single-period
benchmark also under PCP focusing our attention on trade prices and flows. In
essence, we compare the equilibrium outcomes of such a richer model under the
polar invoicing practices in cross-border transactions2 it nests, namely CCP vs.
PCP. Theoretical analysis of these extremes allows us to draw some clear-cut,
mostly qualitative conclusions on the eﬀects of the exchange-rate regime — mod-
elled simply as float vs. peg — on relative prices and key trade measures as well
as on the underlying consumption and labor/leisure choices.
Our principal import is to demonstrate that price-setting assumptions, fun-
damental in any open-economy model with nominal rigidity, aﬀect in a crucial
way optimal consumption allocations under (even only) monetary uncertainty
and, consequently, any microfounded analysis of international trade. In a pre-
view of our results we can state that irrespective of the invoicing assumed, the
exchange-rate regime does not matter for the expected level of trade-to-output
ratios by country, which is always 1 given symmetry and frictionless trading. Yet
under PCP, but not CCP, it matters for the volatility of national trade shares.
A peg would thus stabilize, under PCP, the equilibrium trade share in each
1As defined and exhaustively classified in the recent survey by Lane (2001). A narrower and
more technical summary of the basic NOEM methodology is also provided in Sarno (2001).
2Friberg (1998) points out to the fact that the currency of price setting, the currency of
invoicing and the currency of payment, although theoretically corresponding to three distinct
stages of a typical international trade transaction and hence potentially diﬀerent, practically
coincide ”with few known exceptions”. Therefore we further down use ”invoicing” and ”price
setting” interchangeably (without talking at all about the “currency of payment”).
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country across states of nature at its expected level. This latter level coincides
with the one under CCP, which is the same ex-ante as ex-post. We identify the
diﬀerence in the eﬀects of the exchange-rate regime on equilibrium trade flows
as originating in the particular currency denomination of transactions, hence,
the implied exchange-rate pass-through, and, ultimately, expenditure switching.
In our symmetric framework, this major channel of international spillover of
monetary shocks is absent under CCP and float. As to the PCP model version,
a peg eﬀectively shuts it down, by equalizing at the neutral unitary level the
relative price of foreign goods in terms of domestic analogues households in both
countries face ex-post.
We would not survey here the voluminous literature, classic as well as mod-
ern, on the subject we are interested in. We briefly discuss instead only those
lines of relevant research that have strongly influenced our motivation for the
paper as well as our modelling strategy. In doing so, we also highlight in the next
two subsections two essential features of our set-up which would have important
implications in any open-economy model with price rigidity.
1.1 Monetary Uncertainty in General Equilibrium
Monetary uncertainty generating exchange-rate risk is inherent in issues related
to international trade, welfare and macroeconomic policy in which risk-averse
agents are involved. To be properly studied, such issues have therefore to be cast
in general equilibrium frameworks that are explicitly stochastic.3 That is why
we have purposefully chosen to follow a recent approach in NOEM theoretical
modelling, introduced by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1998, 2000) and Bacchetta and
van Wincoop (1998, 2000 a). It extends the deterministic ”redux” exchange
rate model of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995, 1996: Chapter 10) and its variations
in Corsetti and Pesenti (1997, 2001 a, b, 2002). To our knowledge, the ”redux”
model was the first microfounded open-economy general-equilibrium framework
with rigid prices and monopolistic competition designed to explain exchange-
rate dynamics. Traditional research on exchange rates and trade was either
general-equilibrium but flexible-price,4 or sticky-price but ad-hoc.5 If the impact
of uncertainty on exchange rates and, hence, trade and consumption flows was
at all considered, analysis was restricted to partial-equilibrium models, as duly
pointed out in Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000 a).6
To allow for analytical solutions, the explicitly stochastic NOEM literature
has been technically implemented under simplifying assumptions. Log-normal
processes for shocks and, consequently, for the endogenous variables as well as
rather restrictive specifications of utility are usually imposed, e.g. in Obstfeld
3Earlier models usually considered impulse responses to just a single (one-time) shock
in an otherwise completely deterministic setting. Accordingly, although sometimes named
”stochastic”, they are essentially not.
4E.g. Helpman and Razin (1979, 1982, 1984), Helpman (1981) and Lucas (1982).
5Here one could enumerate papers in the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch tradition of the
1960s and 1970s.
6 See the references cited in their footnote 7, p. 1096. Good surveys can be found in Côté
(1994) and in Glick and Wihlborg (1997).
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and Rogoﬀ (2000). Often, it is also assumed that the Law of One Price (LOP)
and, hence, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) hold7 so that the real exchange
rate (RER) is constant. To benefit from the insights provided by an analytical
solution, we likewise limit our set-up in this initial study to a single period
with only monetary uncertainty, as in Bacchetta and van Wincoop’s (2000 a)
benchmark. Yet in a pursuit of greater generality of our conclusions, we do not
restrict attention to neither a CCP nor a PCP-LOP-PPP model version only.
Furthermore, we need not specialize, for our purposes here, to a log-normal
distribution of disturbances or to a particular class of utility. With respect to
the stochastic processes, it proves suﬃcient to invoke no more restrictions than a
jointly symmetric distribution for the national money stock growth rates. As to
the utility function, we essentially assume that it is well-behaved and separable.
These features make our analysis less restrictive than related earlier work, with
a few exceptions we know about such as Bacchetta and van Wincoop (1998,
2000 a). The latter two authors do not, however, explicitly consider PCP and
its pass-through and expenditure switching implications as well as the eﬀects of
the exchange-rate regime on international relative prices.
1.2 Alternative Price Setting in Open Economies
Another important development in NOEM research has been to incorporate
considerations of the earlier international trade literature, such as Helpman and
Razin (1984) to mention an outstanding example, regarding alternative price
setting. Contributions in this particular direction have been due to Betts and
Devereux (1996, 2000), Bacchetta and van Wincoop (1998, 2000 a, b, 2001),
Devereux and Engel (1998, 1999, 2000), Devereux (2000) and Engel (2000).
Extending the original Obstfeld-Rogoﬀ — Corsetti-Pesenti framework of non-
segmented markets, these authors introduced international market segmenta-
tion in the goods market and what they usually call pricing-to-market (PTM)8
behavior of monopolistically competitive firms, engaging at the same time in
microfounded welfare comparisons of exchange-rate regimes. PTM is often al-
ternatively denoted local currency pricing (LCP),9 but to avoid ambiguity we
would rather use a terminology that is hopefully more precise in our context:
producer ’s currency pricing (PCP) and consumer ’s currency pricing (CCP).10
We already noted in what our analysis diﬀers from, or rather extends and
complements, the one in Bacchetta and van Wincoop (1998, 2000 a). As to
the remaining NOEM literature cited in the preceding paragraph, our study is
justified at least in the following three aspects. First, we examine the eﬀects
of the exchange-rate regime on trade prices and quantities (no matter that our
7Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995, 1996: Chapter 10, 1998, 2000) and Devereux (2000), among
others.
8A term coined by Krugman (1987).
9A coinage due to Devereux (1997) to refer to the special case of PTM where prices are
always set in the currency of the destination market.
10 Since we do not explicitly distinguish an intermediary import/export sector in the two-
country economy we study, as Tille (2000) has first done within NOEM, CCP and PCP are
equivalent here to, respectively, importer ’s (buyer’s) and exporter ’s (seller’s) currency pricing.
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equilibrium allocations, including imports and exports, have also been the re-
sult of underlying optimal consumption/leisure choices), whereas attention in
all quoted papers is focused on welfare issues. Second, and as a consequence of
not undertaking welfare analysis, we are able to allow for a more general utility
specification, while the other authors use quite restrictive utility subclasses, per-
haps narrowing the scope of validity of their findings. Third, under uncertainty
and in cash-in-advance (CiA) sticky-price frameworks — as emphasized in the
insightful methodological books by Magill and Quinzii (1996) and Walsh (1998),
among others — the assumed timing of decisions and price-setting behavior are
crucial to model outcomes. Recognizing these facts and, more importantly,
studying their interaction in a symmetric open-economy context that makes an
explicit parallel between CCP and PCP invoicing is another novel feature of our
approach.
The paper is further down organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the sto-
chastic NOEM model of exchange rate and trade determination we employ and
highlights the diﬀerences in its initial assumptions under CCP vs. PCP. The
third section studies, under float and full symmetry, the role alternative price
setting plays in agents’ optimization and in deriving key equilibrium relation-
ships. Section 4 then focuses on the eﬀects of the exchange-rate regime on
international relative prices and trade flows, by discussing if and how a peg
would change the float allocations of the preceding section. Section 5 concludes
and Appendix A contains the proofs of propositions.
2 A Simple Stochastic NOEM Model of Trade
The present section serves to introduce the model we study. We first describe
the basic set-up that underlies both our model versions. The essential diﬀer-
ences between the CCP vs. PCP cases, originating in the relevant currency
denomination assumptions and reflected in our invoicing-specific notation, are
highlighted next.
2.1 Basic Set-Up
The artificial economy we analyze is made up of two countries, H(ome) and
F(oreign), assumed of equal size. A continuum of diﬀerentiated brands belong-
ing to the same good type is available for consumption. These highly substi-
tutable brands are indexed by i if made in H and by i∗ if made in F . Each such
brand is produced and sold by a single monopolistically competitive firm, also
indexed by i in H and i∗ in F . Firms in Home are uniformly distributed on the
unit interval [0, 1]. Likewise, firms in Foreign produce on (1, 2].
To obtain (short-run) money non-neutrality, we assume sticky prices moti-
vated by menu costs.11 Moreover, monopolistic competition enables each firm
11As first suggested by Mankiw (1985). To recall a classic result in Lucas (1982), with
perfectly flexible prices the exchange-rate regime does not matter, even under uncertainty,
for optimal real allocations. As to the locus of rigidity, some authors prefer to model sticky
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to optimally choose the price(s) at which it sells its product. Prices are set in
advance, i.e. in our ex-ante state 0 (before monetary uncertainty has been re-
solved), and remain valid for just one period, i.e. for the ex-post state s ∈ S we
consider (after shocks in H and F have been observed).12 Preannounced prices
result, in turn, in demand-determined output, on an individual-firm as well as
on an aggregate level.13 In such a (New-)Keynesian situation, technology shocks
do not influence production possibilities and output quantities sold.14
The two model versions, under CCP vs. PCP, we compare have imposed
a specific notation we now summarize. All our quantity variables are denoted
by lowercase Latin letters. These quantities can be indexed by up to two sub-
scripts and up to two superscripts. A first subscript H or F indicates the origin
of the respective variable at the national-economy level, i.e. the country where
a particular good i or i∗ (first subscripts again but at the individual-firm level)
has been produced. Following the tradition, we use an asterisk (∗) as a first
superscript to denote that a particular quantity variable has been consumed in
Foreign. The second subscript, 0 for ex-ante quantities and s for ex-post quan-
tities, indexes the state of nature whereas the second superscript, C (for CCP)
or P (for PCP), indicates the assumed price setting. The same notational rules
apply to the (money) prices or nominal variables that correspond to all respec-
tive quantities in our model, the only diﬀerence being that these are denoted
by uppercase Latin letters. Greek letters, in turn, designate model parameters
and shocks.
Governments and Shocks In each country, there is a government whose
only (passive) role is to proportionally transfer cash denominated in national
currency to all domestic households in a random way.15 Seigniorage is then
repaid in a lump-sum fashion, as is standard in the related literature. We
interpret such a money supply behavior, equivalent in our context to a flexible
exchange-rate system, as exogenous ”monetary policy” and model it in terms
of stochastic money stock growth rates. Moreover, we restrict it to be jointly
symmetric, in the sense we explain next.
For ∀s ∈ S, µs and µ∗s are, respectively, H-money stock and F -money stock
net rates of growth, having the same means and variances. For the sake of sym-
metry, ex-ante (state 0) national money holdings of the representative house-
(nominal or real) wages, following Taylor (1979) and the earlier Keynesian tradition, while
others give preference to sticky prices, following Rotemberg (1982) and Calvo (1983), and as
Kimball (1995) has notably insisted. In essence, the two approaches are not so diﬀerent and —
within NOEM — often imply each other, as Hau (2000) and Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000) have
recently argued.
12 Since our focus is not on inflation dynamics (in general) or inflation persistence (in par-
ticular), the static stochastic framework we borrow from Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000
a) and the related NOEM research seems not too constraining.
13For this to be realistic, we note that our subsequent analysis applies only to money growth
disturbances of a suﬃciently small magnitude.
14That is why we abstract, in this paper, from also modelling productivity disturbances.
Even if explicitly accounted for, they will not change much in the present single-period setting.
15One could argue that monetary authorities are ultimately unable to perfectly control the
money supply or precisely estimate the demand for money in order to always equilibrate them.
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holds in Home and Foreign are assumed identical in terms of units of each
country’s currency:16 M0 = M∗0 . The ex-post (state s) cash balances, i.e. the
domestic-currency budgets with which Home and Foreign households dispose for
transactions purposes in any realized state of nature s ∈ S, are then respectively
given byMs ≡M0+µsM0 = (1 + µs)M0 andM∗s ≡M∗0+µ∗sM∗0 = (1 + µ∗s)M∗0 .
The only diﬀerence between float vs. peg in terms of the (conditional) joint
distribution (up to second moments, inclusive) of national money growth shocks
(µs, µ
∗
s) and, hence, of the resulting ex-post money stocks (Ms,M
∗
s ) thus arises
from their covariance terms. It is imposed by the definition itself of a fixed vs.
flexible exchange-rate regime: under (pure) float, the (conditional) correlation
of national money stocks is 0; under (credible) peg, this (conditional) correlation
is 1. In essence, our fixed exchange-rate version is thus isomorphic to a model
where a monetary union or a single currency area is hit by just one, common
money shock.
Timing of Events In the single period we analyze, decisions are made in two
stages, ex-ante and ex-post. These stages are defined — and distinguished as the
ex-ante state 0 and the ex-post state s — by the moment of the resolution of
monetary uncertainty.
Ex-Ante Behavior Only firms optimize ex-ante, solving a stochastic op-
timization problem. Before knowing the particular state of the world that will
materialize but having common views on the joint distribution of the symmet-
ric monetary shocks, they preannounce prices. Due to (prohibitive) menu costs,
they cannot change ex-post these optimally prefixed prices.
Ex-Post Behavior After observing the state of the world, firms employ
labor to produce goods. Output, hence, labor input and, ultimately, leisure
hours are simply determined in any realized state of nature by the optimal con-
sumption demand for the respective diﬀerentiated product each one of the firms
produces. Households, contrary to firms, optimize only ex-post. After receiving
their random cash, they allocate total money balances across the diﬀerentiated
goods which make up the real consumption composite. Because of demand-
determined output and labor input, households are thus not free to adjust their
labor/leisure trade-oﬀ once a given state of nature has materialized.
Households In each country, H and F , there is a continuum of identical
households. The population in each of these economies is assumed constant and
is normalized to 1. The representative household (in H as well as in F ) likes
diversity and consumes all brands on the interval [0, 2]. It also supplies labor,
earning the equilibrium wage, and owns an equal proportion of domestic firms,
receiving their profits (in the form of dividends).
16At an initial equilibrium exchange rate S0 = 1, as will be discussed later.
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The representative household in Home17 maximizes its ex-post (state s) util-
ity:
Max
cs,ls
u(cs, ls), ∀s ∈ S. (1)
Our utility function is assumed to be well-behaved (i.e. to exist, be continu-
ous, twice diﬀerentiable and concave) and separable. ls is (hours of) leisure and
cs is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) real consumption index defined
in the standard way by the following Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) aggregator:18
cs ≡
h¡
1
2
¢ 1
ϕ (cH,s)
ϕ−1
ϕ +
¡
1
2
¢ 1
ϕ (cF,s)
ϕ−1
ϕ
i ϕ
ϕ−1
, ∀s ∈ S, (2)
with
cH,s ≡


1Z
0
c
ϕ−1
ϕ
i,s di


ϕ
ϕ−1
and cF,s ≡


2Z
1
c
ϕ−1
ϕ
i∗,s di
∗


ϕ
ϕ−1
.
Similarly to Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000 a) and most NOEM set-ups,
we assume that ϕ = ϕ∗ > 1. Thus ϕ in the above formulas is the elasticity
of substitution in demand between any two brands, no matter where they are
produced. ci,s is the consumption by the Home representative household of
brand i produced by a Home firm i and ci∗,s is its consumption of brand i∗
produced by a Foreign firm i∗. cH,s is an index of the consumption by the
Home household of all brands produced in Home and cF,s is an analogous index
for all brands produced in Foreign. Textbook derivations in this well-known
Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) setting19 give the allocation of consumption across brands:
cH,s =
1
2
µ
PH,s
Ps
¶−ϕ
cs, cF,s =
1
2
µ
PF,s
Ps
¶−ϕ
cs;
ci,s =
µ
Pi,s
PH,s
¶−ϕ
cH,s =
1
2
·
Pi,s
Ps
¸−ϕ
cs,
ci∗,s =
µ
Pi,s
PF,s
¶−ϕ
cF,s =
1
2
µ
Pi∗,s
Ps
¶−ϕ
cs.
Pi,s is the price (in Home currency) paid by the Home household for one unit of
a brand i produced by a Home firm i and Pi∗,s is the price (in Home currency)
paid by the Home household for one unit of a brand i∗ produced by a Foreign
firm i∗. PH,s is the price index (in Home currency) paid by the Home household
across all Home produced brands and PF,s is the price index (in Home currency)
paid by the Home household across all Foreign produced brands. Ps is the price
17The notation in which the model is further on set out generally refers to Home, but for
Foreign symmetric relationships hold (unless otherwise stated).
18Accordingly, the representative household in Home (and, analogously, in Foreign) mini-
mizes the cost of buying a unit of real consumption.
19 See, for instance, Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996).
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index (in Home currency) across all brands consumed by the Home household.
These price indexes too are defined in the usual way:20
Ps =
µ
1
2
P 1−ϕH,s +
1
2
P 1−ϕF,s
¶ 1
1−ϕ
with
PH,s =
µZ 1
0
P 1−ϕi,s di
¶ 1
1−ϕ
and PF,s =
µZ 2
1
P 1−ϕi∗,s di
∗
¶ 1
1−ϕ
.
Respective symmetric expressions hold, of course, for Foreign. Note that,
up to this point, all of the indexes are written down as independent of the un-
derlying price setting. Their particular variants under CCP vs. PCP invoicing,
modified by the appropriate notation, are discussed in the next section.
In this representative agent economy, the aggregate constraints on (per-)
household behavior coincide with those of the identical households. They are
standard in NOEM but, for completeness, we briefly present them below.
Time Endowment Constraint The endowment of hours to the repre-
sentative household (in Home) is normalized to 1 in each state,
ls + ns ≡ 1, ∀s ∈ S, (3)
so that ns ≡ 1− ls is (Home) household’s (hours of) labor (supply).
Cash-in-Advance (CiA) Constraint Households need to carry cash be-
fore going to the goods market.21 Moreover, we restrict them to hold and receive
from their monetary authority only domestic currency. Thus (for Home)
csPs|{z}
H national expenditure (in H currency)
≤ Ms|{z}, ∀s ∈ S.
available cash in H (in H currency)
(4)
National Money Market Equilibrium Since CiA constraints are bind-
ing22 and there is no investment and government spending in the model, the
nominal value of national output sold (for consumption) is equal to the total
stock of money in each of the countries. For Home:
Ys =Ms, ∀s ∈ S. (5)
20To represent the minimal expenditure required for the purchase of one unit of the corre-
sponding basket.
21The alternative would be to introduce money and, hence, the nominal exchange rate whose
determination and regimes we wish to analyze, via a money-in-the-utility (MiU) function, also
common in monetary general-equilibrium models. Our modelling choice here is anyway not
crucial, since Feenstra (1986) has demonstrated the equivalence of these two approaches.
22For at least two reasons in our present set-up: (i) this is implied by the concavity of utility
we assumed; (ii) it is also the optimal strategy for the representative household when no future
(i.e. no dynamics) is allowed for, as in the one-period stochastic framework analyzed here.
The binding CiA implies, in turn, a unitary velocity of (quantity theory) money demand (5),
which is, certainly, another limitation but one that is common to similar CiA settings.
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National Income Identity With a nominal wage rate of Ws and total
hours of work amounting to 1 − ls, the nominal labor income of the (Home)
representative household is given by Ws(1 − ls). Nominal dividends from firm
profits earned by this household are denoted by Πs. In equilibrium, all income
from the activity of firms is distributed to domestic households who are their
ultimate owners, as will be assumed (but this happens only at the end of the
one-period framework we consider):23
Ws(1− ls)| {z }
labor income
+ Πs|{z}
ownership income| {z }
H national (factor) income (in H currency)
≡ Ys|{z}, ∀s ∈ S.
H national output (in H currency)
(6)
First-Order Conditions The following ”compact” FONC can be derived
in a familiar way from the above-described constrained optimization problem
for the H representative household:
Ws =
ul,s
uc,s
Ps, ∀s ∈ S. (7)
ul,s and uc,s in (7) are the marginal utilities of leisure and consumption,
respectively, in the realized state s. The real wage rate is thus equal, in equilib-
rium, to the ratio of these marginal utilities.
Firms Unlike the NOEM alternative of ”yeoman-farmers”, firms exist in them-
selves in our model and eﬀect production. A usual restriction in similar settings
we impose at this stage too is that firms are owned by domestic households
only. In the present study we also abstract from an international stock market,
as well as of risk-sharing issues in general. As noted, product diﬀerentiation
makes firms monopolistically competitive. We focus here on the case where dif-
ferentiated brands belong to the same type of a homogeneous good produced
in both countries with identical technology common to all firms.24 Just one
factor, labor, available in fixed quantities in both economies, is used as input.
For Home:
ys = ns = 1− ls. (8)
Such a production function does seem simplistic, but is actually suﬃcient
for the purposes of our sticky-price single-period analysis here. The reason is
that, given the (New-)Keynesian set-up we described, it is household demand
and not productivity that ultimately determines output.
23Factor income is thus not used further on, to buy consumption goods and to lend or
borrow, with no future modelled.
24 In Mihailov (2003 a) we allow for national good types that diﬀer in the sense of being
less substitutable than brands.
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Foreign
Trade
csCPC
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ci,sj*,CPi*,C ci*,sj*,CPi**,C
Home
Figure 1: Notation on Price and Quantity Aggregation under CCP
2.2 CCP vs. PCP Version
As already mentioned, the combination of timing and nominal rigidity assump-
tions plays an important role in similar stochastic CiA models. In our case, it
aﬀects in a crucial way the nature of optimization under CCP vs. PCP. More
precisely, the exchange rate does not matter for households decision problem
under CCP but becomes a key consideration under PCP. The reason is in the
particular currency denomination implied by our alternative invoicing assump-
tions.
Under CCP, households pay for imports as well as for home-produced goods
directly in their national currency. The equilibrium exchange rate, although
observed (calculated implicitly) at the moment of the realization of the national
money growth shocks, does not play a role in consumer optimization. It only
matters for firms, as their profits from exports denominated in foreign currency
are converted back into domestic currency. In short, the ex-post exchange rate
does not aﬀect households optimizing behavior and, hence, trade allocations.
Under PCP, households use part of their domestic-currency money balances in
the realized state of nature to buy, at the equilibrium exchange rate, the foreign
currency needed for imports. In short, the ex-post exchange rate now influences
the optimizing behavior of households and, hence, trade allocations.
For a schematic representation of prices, quantities and their (definitional)
interrelations as well as of the general structure of our CCP vs. PCP model ver-
sions, compare the respective elements and blocks in figures 1 vs. 2. Additional
explanatory comments follow suit.
3 The Role of Price Setting
The model and notation we have introduced thus far enables us to draw, in the
present section, an explicit parallel between the essential diﬀerences in the opti-
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cH,sPPHP cF,sPSsP·PF*,P
ci,sj,PPiP ci*,sj,PSsP·Pi**,P
cs*,PPs*,P
cH,s*,PPHP/SsP cF,s*,PPF*,P
ci,sj*,PPiP/SsP ci*,sj*,PPi**,P
Home
Figure 2: Notation on Price and Quantity Aggregation under PCP
mizing behavior and the resulting consumption demand and monopolistic pric-
ing functions across alternative price setting. On that basis, a formal definition
of equilibrium, in the context of our two model versions, is provided. Under float
and symmetry, we then derive CCP vs. PCP results for the exchange-rate level,
international relative prices, cross-country consumption/leisure allocations and,
most importantly, some key measures of trade flows. The underlying algebra is
systematized in more detail in Appendix A.
3.1 Optimization and Equilibrium
Consumption Demands and Price Levels The consumption aggregator
(2) is only at first sight identical across our alternative price-setting assump-
tions. The reason is that its components, cH,s and cF,s, although seemingly
the same, are in fact optimally defined by diﬀerent expressions under CCP vs.
PCP.25 They originate in some initial, pricing and quantity invoicing-specific
conventions but, as the optimization proceeds on and is nationally aggregated,
these diﬀerences also feed into the resulting analytical outcomes.
Standard derivations à la Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) under CCP vs. PCP result
in Home optimal demands for H- (equation (9) below) and F -produced (10)
brands and the respective price indices at the domestic absorption (11), import
demand (12) and consumer (13) levels as follows:
cCH,s =
1
2
µ
PCH
PC
¶−ϕ
Ms
PC
vs. cPH,s =
1
2
µ
PPH
PPs
¶−ϕ
Ms
PPs
; (9)
25That is what imposed the more complicated notation we employ furtehr down in the
paper, e.g. cCH,s and cCH,s vs. cPH,s and cPF,s, as well as the need to discuss in parallel the key
CCP vs. PCP model version diﬀerences.
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cCF,s =
1
2
µ
PCF
PC
¶−ϕ
Ms
PC
vs. cPF,s =
1
2


≡PPF,sz }| {
SPs P
∗,P
F
PPs


−ϕ
Ms
PPs
; (10)
with
PCH ≡


1Z
0
¡
PCi
¢1−ϕ
di


1
1−ϕ
vs. PPH ≡


1Z
0
¡
PPi
¢1−ϕ
di


1
1−ϕ
; (11)
PCF ≡


2Z
1
¡
PCi∗
¢1−ϕ
di∗


1
1−ϕ
vs. SPs P
∗,P
F| {z }
≡PPF,s
≡


2Z
1
³
SPs P
∗,P
i∗
´
| {z }
≡PPi∗,s
1−ϕ
di∗


1
1−ϕ
; (12)
PC ≡
h
1
2
¡
PCH
¢1−ϕ
+ 12
¡
PCF
¢1−ϕi 11−ϕ
vs. (13)
PPs ≡


1
2
¡
PPH
¢1−ϕ
+ 12
³
SPs P
∗,P
F
´
| {z }
≡PPF,s
1−ϕ


1
1−ϕ
.
Clearly, under PCP the exchange-rate pass-through to import prices is uni-
tary, while under CCP it is prefixed (cf. the CCP vs. PCP expression in
(12)). For the same reason, the CPI is constant under CCP, PC , but state-
dependent under PCP, PPs (cf. equations (13)). This causes demands for even
domestically-produced brands, at first sight identical, to be actually diﬀerent
across our alternative price-setting assumptions (cf. the CCP vs. PCP expres-
sion in (9)).
Output Prices Similarly to the consumption aggregator (2), the expected
market value of real profits26 which a Home firm i ∈ [0, 1]maximizes is seemingly
the same, but is nevertheless diﬀerently defined under CCP vs. PCP:
Max
PCi ,P
∗,C
i
E0


uc,s
PC
³
PCi c
C
i,s + S
C
s P
∗,C
i c
∗,C
i,s −WCs cCi,s −WCs c
∗,C
i,s
´
| {z }
≡ΠCi,s

 , s ∈ S (14)
26Note that the relevant weights for the states of nature in the formulas we introduce are
related to the marginal utility of consumtion of the representative shareholder, uc,s.
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vs. Max
PPi
E0


uc,s
PPs
³
PPi c
P
i,s + P
P
i c
∗,P
i,s −WPs cPi,s −WPs c
∗,P
i,s
´
| {z }
≡ΠPi,s

 , s ∈ S. (15)
Under CCP this firm i — which in our setting is also the Home representative
firm — presets two prices, one in national currency and the other in foreign cur-
rency. Under PCP just one price, in national currency, is prefixed. Using the
respective first order conditions, CCP vs. PCP optimal prices of the Home rep-
resentative firm (relevant for consumer households in the domestic and foreign
market) are thus:
PCi = P
C
H =
ϕ
ϕ− 1
E0
£
uc,sWCs Ms
¤
E0 [uc,sMs]
vs. (16)
PPi = P
P
H =
ϕ
ϕ− 1
E0
·
uc,s
PPs
WPs
¡
PPs
¢ϕ−1 ¡
Ms + SPs M
∗
s
¢¸
E0
·
uc,s
PPs
(PPs )
ϕ−1
(Ms + SPs M∗s )
¸ ; (17)
P ∗,Ci = P
∗,C
H =
ϕ
ϕ− 1
E0
£
uc,sWCs M
∗
s
¤
E0 [uc,sSCs M∗s ]
vs. (18)
P ∗,PH,s ≡
PPH
SPs| {z }
LOP
⇒ P ∗,Ps =
PPs
SPs| {z }
PPP
. (19)
As evident from (19), the price at which Home representative firm’s product
sells in Foreign under PCP, P ∗,PH,s , depends on the exchange-rate level that has
materialized ex-post, SPs . In fact, it is LOP applied to the homogeneous good
type (diﬀerentiated across monopolistically produced brands) in the present
context that underlies the above PCP Foreign import price definition. Moreover
as we noted earlier, the price which is preset in the currency of the seller (Home,
in the case we comment here) under PCP, PPH , becomes state-dependent when
converted — via the observed exchange rate, SPs — in the currency of the buyer,
P ∗,PH,s .
To sum up, the diﬀerence between our invoicing conventions boils down to
the following: under CCP, CPIs are fixed across states (PC and P ∗,C); by
contrast, under PCP the price of imported goods moves with the exchange
rate, hence so do CPIs (PPs and P
∗,P
s ). This is the major channel of monetary
shocks transmission — with polar eﬀect via pass-through on optimal expenditure
switching — along which we distinguish and interpret the model versions under
our alternative price setting.
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Definition of Equilibrium We now formally define an equilibrium concept
that corresponds to the described sequential optimization.
Definition 1 In the context of the model versions we presented, an equilibrium
is a set of quantities and prices, such that:
1. [Ex-Ante Conditions] before the resolution of monetary uncertainty
but given commonly held views about the joint symmetric distribution of
money growth shocks (µs, µ
∗
s);
(a) [Firms Stochastic Optimization] given their technology constraint and
the expected quantities demanded in the goods market,
©
E0
£
cCH,s
¤
,
E0
h
c∗,CH,s
i
, E0
h
c∗,CF,s
i
, E0
£
cCF,s
¤ª
under CCP or
©
E0
£
cPH,s
¤
, E0
h
c∗,PH,s
i
,
E0
h
c∗,PF,s
i
, E0
£
cPF,s
¤ª
under PCP, the prices,
©
PCH , P
∗,C
H , P
∗,C
F , P
C
F
ª
under CCP or
©
PPH , P
∗,P
F
o
under PCP, that are optimally preset ex-
ante (i.e. in state 0) and bindingly posted to consumer households for
transactions ex-post (in state s for ∀s ∈ S) solve the profit maximiza-
tion problem of the representative producer firm in Home as well as
in Foreign;
2. [Ex-Post Conditions] following the resolution of monetary uncertainty
and in any state of nature s ∈ S that has materialized;
(a) [Households Labor-Leisure Trade-Oﬀ ] given its constraints and the
posted prices,
©
PCH , P
∗,C
H , P
∗,C
F , P
C
F
ª
under CCP or
©
PPH , P
∗,P
F
o
under PCP, the representative consumer household in Home as well
as in Foreign spends up all available cash on its total real consump-
tion {cs, c∗s}; hours of work (employment) {1− ls , 1− l∗s} are sup-
plied by households until firms demand labor to equilibrate ex-post
consumption demand for their diﬀerentiated products at the resulting
equilibrium real wage rates
½
Ws
Ps
,
W ∗s
P ∗s
¾
;
(b) [Households Consumer Basket Allocation] given the posted prices,©
PCH , P
∗,C
H , P
∗,C
F , P
C
F
ª
under CCP or
©
PPH , P
∗,P
F
o
under PCP, the
consumption quantities
©
cCH,s , c
∗,C
H,s, c
∗,C
F,s , c
C
F,s
ª
under CCP or
©
cPH,s ,
c∗,PH,s, c
∗,P
F,s , c
P
F,s
ª
under PCP solve the cost minimization problem à
la Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) of the representative consumer household in
Home as well as in Foreign;
(c) [Goods Market Clearing] all quantities under CCP or PCP satisfy the
feasibility conditions for each diﬀerentiated brand so that all product-
brand markets — and, hence, the international product-type market as
a whole — clear;
(d) [Forex Market Clearing] the international forex market clears as well.
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3.2 Equilibrium Nominal Exchange Rate
The simple symmetric structure of the model we analyze allows an explicit
derivation of the equilibrium nominal exchange rate (NER).27 It solves the in-
ternational forex market clearing condition which states that excess supply of
each of the two currencies (expressed in the same monetary unit28) is zero in
any state of nature s ∈ S:29
PCF c
C
F,s| {z }
F export revenues ⇔ HC supply
− SCs · P ∗,CH c∗,CH,s| {z }
H export revenues ⇔ HC demand
= 0 (20)
vs. SPs · P ∗,PF cPF,s| {z }
H import demand ⇔ HC supply
− PPH c
∗,P
H,s| {z }
F import demand ⇔ HC demand
= 0. (21)
Substituting for optimal demands above as well as for the ideal H and F
CPI definitions further on in the algebraic manipulation derives the following
general expressions for the equilibrium NER under CCP vs. PCP:
SCs =
1 +
³
P∗,CF
P∗,CH
´1−ϕ
1 +
³
PCH
PCF
´1−ϕ MsM∗s vs. SPs =
1 +
³
SPs P
∗
F
PPH
´1−ϕ
1 +
Ã
PH
SPs
P∗,PF
!1−ϕ MsM∗s . (22)
Equilibrium NER under Full Symmetry Under full symmetry, i.e. with
PCH = P
∗,C
F , P
C
F = P
∗,C
H , P
C = P ∗,C under CCP vs. PPH = P
∗,P
F , P
P
F,s ≡
SPs P
∗,P
F , P
∗,P
H,s ≡
PPH
SPs
, PPs = S
P
s P
∗,P
s under PCP, the above expressions simplify
to
SCs =
Ms
M∗s
vs. SPs =
µ
Ms
M∗s
¶ 1
ϕ
. (23)
The equilibrium exchange rate (23) under CCP vs. PCP only diﬀers in
including or not the key model parameter, ϕ = ϕ∗ > 1. This result implies
that, in equilibrium, the NER should be less volatile under PCP than under
CCP,30 just because of substitutions via imports/exports induced by the pass-
through eﬀect under PCP. In both cases, however, the equilibrium exchange rate
27The nominal exchange rate is defined in the usual way as the Home -currency price of
Foreign money.
28Taking the currency of H as the common unit of account below.
29Note as well that because of symmetry this condition also imposes, in eﬀect, balanced
trade for both economies no matter the particular state that has materialized.
30A point first made by Betts and Devereux (1996). It is also evident that, for a given
symmetric distribution of money growth shocks, NER volatility will thus be lower under
PCP by a magnitude depending directly on the particular value of consumption demand
substitutability, ϕ, or, alternatively, the degree of monopolistic competition, ϕϕ−1 .
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is a function of fundamentals, namely the money stocks in Home and Foreign.
The more general formula (22) does not impose full symmetry in order to apply
simplifying substitutions relying on PPP, PPs = S
P
s P
∗,P
s under PCP or even
stronger equations such as, in our CCP case, PC = P ∗,C . The benefit from
looking at (22) is that this formula makes evident another principal diﬀerence
between the price-setting assumptions we study here. In general, the equilibrium
exchange rate in a sticky-price model of trade will depend not only on relative
money stocks but also on relative price levels resulting from aggregation of the
optimally prefixed prices of domestic and foreign (highly substitutable) brands.
This is true for both the cases of CCP and PCP, but the diﬀerence is, again, that
in our PCP version import prices are state-dependent, and hence sensitive to
(or aﬀected by) the ex-post exchange rate, whereas this is not so under CCP.31
Optimal Firm Prices under Full Symmetry Using (7) and its equivalent
for Foreign as well as (23) under CCP and PCP to substitute for the endogenous
variables Ws, W ∗s and Ss in (16) through (19), the optimal firm prices derived
earlier can now be fully determined. The final model solutions for prices in
terms of exogenous variables and parameters only are thus:
PCi = P
C
H =
ϕ
ϕ− 1P
C E0 [ul,sMs]
E0 [uc,sMs]
vs.
PPi = P
P
H =
ϕ
ϕ− 1
E0
·
ul,s
¡
PPs
¢ϕ−1µ
Ms +M
1
ϕ
s M
∗ϕ−1ϕ
s
¶¸
E0
·
uc,s
PPs
(PPs )
ϕ−1
µ
Ms +M
1
ϕ
s M
∗ϕ−1ϕ
s
¶¸ ;
P ∗,Ci = P
∗,C
H =
ϕ
ϕ− 1P
∗,CE0 [ul,sM
∗
s ]
E0 [uc,sMs]
vs.
P ∗,PH,s ≡
PPH³
Ms
M∗s
´ 1
ϕ| {z }
LOP
⇒ P ∗,Ps =
PPs³
Ms
M∗s
´ 1
ϕ| {z }
PPP
.
As in Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000 a), it is easily seen that under
CCP the prices set by the Home representative firm domestically, PCH , and
abroad, P ∗,CH , will be the same only if E0 [ul,sMs] = E0 [ul,sM
∗
s ]. This will
always be true under peg, since then M∗s can be substituted by Ms everywhere
in the formulas up to here, but not generally under float. Bacchetta and van
Wincoop (2000 a) formally prove, in their Lemma 1 and related Proposition
1, that E0 [ul,sMs] = E0 [ul,sM∗s ] and, hence, P
C
H = P
∗,C
H is true only when
31Another parameter that will also, in principle, determine the equilibrium exchange rate in
this type of NOEM set-ups could be a nationally-specific elasticity of substitution in consump-
tion, ϕ 6= ϕ∗ (or, equivalently, a nationally-specific degree of product market monopolization,
ϕ
ϕ−1 6= ϕ
∗
ϕ∗−1 ).
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utility is separable in consumption and leisure. To be able to continue now
with our focus, in this initial study, on the fully-symmetric case, in section 2
we purposefully assumed this less general case which is nevertheless widespread
when it comes to modelling preferences. With separable utility under CCP and
float, the prices optimally preset domestically and abroad will therefore be the
same, due to symmetry, so that PCH = P
∗,C
H = P
C
F = P
∗,C
F .
It is also clear from the respective formula above for Home and the corre-
sponding one for Foreign that under PCP and float, when just one price is opti-
mally prefixed in each country, in the domestic currency, the two preannounced
prices will have the same level, PPH = P
∗,P
F , given symmetry and separability
again. Yet the respective ex-post PCP prices in the foreign currency, P ∗,PH,s and
PPF,s, will in general not be equal to those preset domestically, as we stressed
earlier. Observe, however, for future use that under PCP and peg the domestic-
currency prices of home and foreign substitutes faced by consumers in a given
country will be the same for any s ∈ S, so that PPH = P
∗,P
H = P
P
F = P
∗,P
F
(ex-post as well as ex-ante).
A final set of key equations in the model provides, under full symmetry,
straightforward expressions for some traditional characteristics of international
trade. In addition to the trade share in output by country considered in Bac-
chetta and van Wincoop (2000 a) under CCP, in our present extension we also
discuss two other aspects, missing in their study and central to understanding
the CCP vs. PCP outcomes of our analysis. These aspects concern international
relative prices and the share of world trade in world output.
3.3 Equilibrium Relative Prices
Relative Price of Foreign to Domestic Goods We saw that under CCP
with jointly symmetric money shocks and separable preferences, all prices are
optimally prefixed in the currency of the buyer at the same level: PCH = P
∗,C
H =
PCF = P
∗,C
F . As a consequence, the relative price of foreign-produced goods in
terms of domestically-produced ones in both countries is predetermined at 1:32
pCH ≡
PCF
PCH
= 1 =
P ∗,CH
P ∗,CF
≡ p∗,CF for ∀s ∈ S. (24)
Under PCP, the prices which firms preannounce in their domestic currency
have likewise the same level across countries, PPH = P
∗,P
F . However, the corre-
sponding foreign-currency prices obtained via LOP, P ∗,PH,s and P
P
F,s, can remain
equal to the domestic-currency ones only if some low-probability state of relative
monetary equilibrium, se ∈ Se ⊂ S, occurs. In general, the resulting relative
prices of foreign-produced goods in terms of domestically-produced ones under
PCP are reciprocal across countries and reflect directly the ex-post nominal
exchange rate:
32 In such a way, any eﬀects of the ex-post values of these key international relative prices
on consumer behavior are precluded under CCP.
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pPH,s ≡
≡PPF,sz }| {
SPs P
∗,P
F
PPH
= SPs =


≡P∗,PH,sz}|{
PPH
SPs
P∗,PF


−1
≡
³
p∗,PF,s
´−1
6= 1 unless se. (25)
Terms of Trade In our symmetric set-up, the terms of trade (ToT) are in-
versely defined — across countries for the same invoicing convention as well as
across price setting assumptions for each of the countries with respect to the
nominal exchange rate. Our CCP model version thus implies a negative rela-
tionship between the NER and the ToT: a nominal depreciation improves the
terms of trade. Just the opposite eﬀect is, however, predicted by our PCP
model version: the relationship between the NER and the ToT is positive, so
that a nominal depreciation weakens the terms of trade and induces, in turn,
expenditure switching, an international spillover channel largely debated in the
Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch tradition:
(ToT )CH,s ≡
≡P Im ,CHz}|{
PCF
SCs P
∗,C
H| {z }
PEx ,CH
= 1SCs
=


≡P Im ,CFz }| {
P ∗,CH
PCF
SCs|{z}
≡PEx ,CF,s


−1
≡
h
(ToT )∗,CF,s
i−1
6= 1 unless se vs.
(26)
(ToT )PH,s ≡
≡P Im ,PH,sz}|{
PPF,s
PPH|{z}
≡PEx ,PH,s
=
SPs P
∗,P
F
PPH
= SPs =


≡P Im ,PF,sz}|{
PPH
SPs
P ∗F|{z}
≡PEx ,PF,s


−1
≡
h
(ToT )∗,PF,s
i−1
6= 1 unless se.
(27)
This latter result, which we have explicitly derived from microfoundations,
is in line with findings in other recent NOEM papers, in particular with the
Obstfeld-Rogoﬀ (2000) correlation approach of checking for pricing-to-market
in macrodata.33
Real Exchange Rate In compliance with the PPP literature, our symmetric
PCP model results in a microfounded real exchange rate (RER) that is constant
(across states of nature) at 1 in equilibrium:
33Our theoretical point here is the subject of related empirical work in Mihailov (2003 b).
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(RER)PH ≡
SPs P
∗,P
s
PPs
=
PPs
PPs
= 1 =
P ∗,Ps
P ∗,Ps
=
PPs
SPs
P ∗,Ps
≡ (RER)∗,PF for ∀s ∈ S.
(28)
On the other hand, our CCP version leads to a parallel equilibrium outcome
of a RER that moves one-to-one with the NER (across states of nature), as
consistent with the higher RER volatility implied by PTM-based models:
(RER)CH,s ≡
SCs P
∗,C
PC
= SCs =


PC
SCs
P ∗,C


−1
≡
h
(RER)∗,CF,s
i−1
6= 1 unless se.
(29)
3.4 Equilibrium Consumption and Leisure across Coun-
tries
To better understand the implications of the microfounded general-equilibrium
framework we study for CCP vs. PCP trade flows, we now have to first consider
its outcomes across price setting in terms of the ingredients of the utility func-
tion, namely consumption and leisure. Our essential points are summarized in
the propositions we state in their logical order throughout the present subsec-
tion. Proofs, based largely on earlier definitions and derivations, are provided
in Appendix A whereas interpretations follow further down in the main text.
Proposition 1 (Relative Consumption) Relative real consumption is ultimately
determined by the relative money stock, no matter the particular price setting
assumed.
To put it diﬀerently, Proposition 1 establishes that it is national money
shocks and, consequently, relative money stocks (or relative wealth in our simple
NOEM framework) that really matter — via demand and trade — for ex-post real
consumption diﬀerences across the ex-ante symmetric countries, irrespective
of the invoicing convention. Note, however, that under CCP but not PCP
the relative money stock is also the equilibrium nominal exchange rate and
that under PCP but not CCP the elasticity of consumption demand, ϕ > 1,
mitigates34 the eﬀect of relative monetary disequilibria. More importantly, there
is another, principal diﬀerence between our price-setting assumptions which
results from the fact that CCP prevents substitution across borders, and hence
expenditure switching, while under PCP such substitution is optimal, as we
show next.
Proposition 2 (Consumption Switching) Under CCP the optimal split-up of
real consumption between demand for domestic and foreign goods is always 50 :
50 whereas under PCP it is ultimately determined by the relative money stock.
34Compared to the CCP case.
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Proposition 2 is of major importance for understanding our equilibrium trade
share outcomes across price-setting assumptions to be discussed in more detail
later on. It implies that in the CCP model version a monetary expansion —
coordinated under peg or unilateral under float — does not induce any bias in
goods consumption. In the PCP case, by contrast, a monetary expansion in
one of the countries results — by depreciating (appreciating, for the other coun-
try) the equilibrium exchange rate, making imports more expensive (cheaper)
and inducing substitution away from (into) them — in a bias in both countries
favoring consumption of the goods produced in the expansionary country.
Proposition 3 (Relative Leisure) Under CCP equilibrium output, employment
and leisure (but not consumption) are always equal across countries whereas
under PCP output, employment and leisure (as well as consumption) are ulti-
mately determined by the relative money stock and are thus not generally equal
across nations.
The basic intuition behind Proposition 3 is that under CCP — when there
is optimally no consumption switching away from the preferred 50 : 50 split-
up — the two countries always produce the same real quantities of output, no
matter the particular state of nature that has occurred. Because of the iden-
tical technologies, the two countries furthermore employ the same amount of
labor, i.e. employment is the same as well. Therefore, the hours of leisure
the representative household in Home and in Foreign enjoys — residually, due
to the demand-determined output and, hence, labor input — under CCP are
always the same too. By contrast, under PCP — when consumers switch to
the cheaper product due to the now operating pass-through channel — the two
countries do not produce the same real quantities of output, unless some state of
nature of relative monetary equilibrium has materialized. Due to the identical
technologies again, the two countries do not employ the same amount of labor.
Consequently, the hours of leisure the representative household in Home and in
Foreign enjoys under PCP are generally not the same either.
To provide certain parallels between the present set-up and the preceding
related literature,35 we finally consider the traditional example of the impact of
a one-time money supply shock. Since the model here is explicitly stochastic,
we shall rather be talking about relative monetary expansion or relative money
stock disequilibrium. In order not to violate the credibility of our sticky-price
environment, we more precisely analyze ex-post allocations in response to money
stock growth shocks of a small magnitude occurring after the initial symmetric
equilibrium.
Proposition 4 (Impact of Monetary Expansion) In our CCP model version,
any relative monetary disequilibrium under float increases the ex-post utility
of the residents of the expansionary country relative to the ex-post utility of
the residents of the contractionary country. Interestingly, PCP inverses this
beggar-thy-neighbor conclusion into a beggar-thyself one.
35E.g. Obstfeld-Rogoﬀ (1995) and the numerous papers building on it.
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The logic underlying Proposition 4 is that in our CCP model version house-
holds in both economies enjoy equal amount of leisure in any state that has
materialized, but at the same time those in the expansionary economy consume
more relative to their neighbors in the contractionary economy. So overall,
ex-post utility is higher in the expansionary country, a result reminiscent of
(but not identical to) ”beggar-thy-neighbor” policies debated in the Mundell-
Fleming-Dornbusch tradition. Under PCP, by contrast, the gain of the Home
representative household in consumption relative to the Foreign one is lower
than its simultaneous relative loss in leisure (when consumption and leisure are
equally valued, as we assume for our purposes here). Under PCP, therefore,
Home residents are worse-oﬀ than Foreign ones in cross-country ex-post utility
terms following a Home relative monetary expansion, a finding similar (but not
equivalent) to classic and more recent ”beggar-thyself ” reasoning.
3.5 Equilibrium Trade Flows
Trade Shares by Country Under CCP vs. PCP, Home36 equilibrium (ex-
post) foreign trade / GDP ratio in each state of nature s ∈ S is defined by
(ft)CH,s ≡
(Ex )CH,s + (Im)
C
H,s
(DA)CH,s + (Ex )
C
H,s
=
SCs · P ∗,CH · c∗,CH,s + PCF · cCF,s
PCH · cCH,s + SCs · P ∗,CH · c∗,CH,s
vs. (30)
(ft)PH,s ≡
(Ex )PH,s + (Im)
P
H,s
(DA)PH,s + (Ex )
P
H,s
=
PPH · c∗,PH,s +
≡PPF,sz }| {
SPs · P ∗,PF · cPF,s
PPH · cPH,s + PPH · c∗,PH,s
, (31)
where (Ex )CH,s denotes Home exports, (Im)
C
H,s Home imports and (DA)
C
H,s
Home domestic absorption, all these three Home-currency values (prices multi-
plied by quantities) under CCP and in any state s ∈ S that has materialized.
(Ex )PH,s, (Im)
P
H,s and (DA)
P
H,s are, of course, the respective PCP values.
Substitutions for optimal demands and use of the Home ideal CPI definition
derive — under full symmetry and separable preferences — the CCP vs. PCP
trade share curve for Home:
(ft)CH =
2³
PCH
P∗,CH
´1−ϕ
+ 1
=
2³
E0[ul,sMs]
E0[ul,sM∗s ]
´1−ϕ
+ 1
= const = 1 vs. (32)
(ft)PH,s =
2³
PPs
P∗,Ps
´ϕ−1
+ 1
=
2
(SPs )
ϕ−1
+ 1
=
2³
Ms
M∗s
´ϕ−1
ϕ
+ 1
6= 1 unless se.
(33)
36For Foreign, the corresponding expressions are symmetric.
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The corresponding trade share curve for Foreign is symmetrically given by
(ft)CF =
2³
P∗,CF
PCH
´1−ϕ
+ 1
=
2µ
E0[u∗l,sM∗s ]
E0[u∗l,sMs]
¶1−ϕ
+ 1
= const = 1 = (ft)CH vs.
(34)
(ft)PF,s =
2³
P∗,Ps
PPs
´ϕ−1
+ 1
=
2³
1
SPs
´ϕ−1
+ 1
=
2³
M∗s
Ms
´ϕ−1
ϕ
+ 1
6= 1 6= (ft)PH,s unless se.
(35)
These two pairs of equations compare directly the impact of our alterna-
tive price-setting assumptions on trade, measured relative to output.37 Under
CCP, (32) and (34) show that the equilibrium trade share is constant at 1 in
each country and in any state of nature that has materialized. Under PCP, by
contrast, this is not generally the case: as clear from (33) and (35), national
trade-to-output ratios now both become state-dependent, i.e. volatile, unless
some low-probability state se of relative monetary equilibrium occurs.
To see the intuition behind, assume a Home relative monetary expansion
and compare the numerator and denominator in (30) under float. Under CCP,
no substitution occurs between domestic and foreign brands of the same product
type we model here, due to the preset buyer ’s currency prices and the resulting
foreign/domestic relative price equality across countries in (24). That is why
the additional (or excessive, with respect to Foreign) Home cash in the observed
state of nature sH ∈ SH ⊂ S splits up evenly (50 : 50) into a domestic demand
increase and an import demand increase:38 (DA)CH,sH ↑= (Im)
C
H,sH ↑. Thus,
the denominator in (30) changes by the same amount as the numerator, and the
trade/output ratio remains constant (across states).
Under PCP, by contrast, prices are prefixed in the currency of the seller.
Therefore, the observed nominal exchange rate aﬀects import prices, and hence
consumer price levels, thus partly ”flexibilizing” our otherwise fix-price model.
The ex-post NER feeds on into the foreign/domestic relative price reciprocity
across countries highlighted in (25). This key relative price is now state-dependent
and, in turn, influences itself optimal consumer decisions on cross-border sub-
stitution39 in demand. Home import demand falls as more expensive imports
resulting from the depreciated exchange rate (relative to its ex-ante equilibrium
of 1) are substituted away and into domestic analogues so that domestic demand
rises, as well as Home exports, for the same (or rather symmetric) reason applied
to Foreign importing households:40 (Im)PH,sH ↓= (Ex )
P
H,sH ↑= (DA)
P
H,sH ↑.
37The first equality in the formulas expresses the trade/GDP ratio as a function of price
levels. The last equality is, in turn, the reduced-form version which expresses trade relative
to output as a function of the exogenous variables only.
38As formally shown in Proposition 2.
39Whose degree depends on the particular value of the key elasticity parameter ϕ = ϕ∗ > 1.
40According to Proposition 2, again.
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Figure 3: PCP Trade Share Curves under ”Usual” Monopolistic Competition
(for a markup of 10%, i.e. ϕ = 11)
Thus, the denominator in (31) goes up whereas the numerator stays flat, as
rising exports and falling imports compensate exactly each other in value. The
equilibrium trade share in Home is consequently less than its CCP magnitude
of 1, and the trade share in Foreign is more than 1, following a Home relative
monetary expansion.
To illustrate the interpretation suggested above, we present in Figure 3 the
PCP trade share curves for Home, equation (33), and for Foreign, equation (35),
according to a baseline computation we have performed setting ϕ = 11. This
latter value of the elasticity of substitution in consumption demand is consistent
with a markup ϕϕ−1 of 10%, a largely consensual estimate in empirical studies.
For completeness, we have also studied the cases of a very elastic demand,
ϕ = 101, which corresponds to a tiny markup of only 1% as in Figure 4 and of
almost inelastic demand, ϕ = 2, corresponding to a huge markup of 100% as in
Figure 5. The graphs show the trade share in output (ft)Ps (on the vertical axis)
under PCP, float and full symmetry as a function of the equilibrium nominal
exchange rate SPs or, ultimately, the underlying relative money stock
Ms
M∗s
(on
the horizontal axis).
A comparison among the reported three cases shows that the degree of substi-
tutability ϕ > 1 across the individualized brands that nations exchange within
the same type of good under PCP trade — or, alternatively, the degree of imper-
fect competition identified by the monopolistic markup ϕϕ−1 > 1 charged over
price — matters a lot in related analyses. In particular, PCP trade share curves
are much flatter and more curved in the vicinity of 1 under low substitutability
and highly monopolized world market structure relative to the ”normal” situa-
tion (ϕ = 11). By contrast, these same curves are almost vertical and straight
in the near vicinity of 1 with high substitutability and competition close to
perfect.
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World Trade Share
Proposition 5 (World Trade Share) For the world economy as a whole, the
trade-to-output ratio is constant at 1 in any state of nature s ∈ S, due to
symmetry and no matter the particular price setting assumed.
Under CCP, Home nominal trade is always equal to Home nominal output so
that the Home trade share in output is constant at 1, irrespective of the state of
nature that has materialized. The same is true for Foreign, and as a consequence
the (equally-weighted) world trade-to-GDP ratio is also 1 for ∀s ∈ S.41 Under
PCP, by contrast, Home and Foreign trade shares in output are state-dependent
and not equal to each other and to 1 unless relative monetary equilibrium occurs
(se ⊂ S). However, as can also be verified by looking at figures 3, 4, and 5 the
Home and Foreign trade share curves are complementary in the sense that at
each point they sum to 2, so that world trade equals world output for ∀s ∈ S.
4 Eﬀects of the Exchange-Rate Regime
Making further use of the equilibrium solutions under float we characterized
thus far, the present section summarizes the implications of a peg, and there-
fore of the alternative exchange-rate regimes we study here, for international
trade prices and flows. Our regime comparisons discussed below are made along
two dimensions, namely with respect to ex-post (equilibrium) and ex-ante (ex-
pected) trade measures. The reason is that when evaluating float vs. peg under
(monetary) uncertainty it is the expected levels of the relevant variables, i.e.
integrated over the entire distribution of shocks, that can be meaningfully com-
pared, the ex-post ones being stochastic, i.e. state-specific. We saw, however,
that our equilibriummodel outcomes concerning, in particular, the share of nom-
inal trade in nominal output by country were not necessarily state-dependent,
and whether they were or not depended on the currency of invoicing assumed.
Moreover, the equilibrium solutions are a necessary first step in deriving the
expected ones. That is why we also retain in what follows the ex-post dimension
of our analysis.
4.1 Comparative Synthesis of Equilibrium Results
Table 1 captures in a synthetic form the eﬀects we evoked in our propositions up
to now. It compares the equilibrium model outcomes under a flexible exchange-
rate regime across the alternative price-setting conventions studied.
Similarly, Table 2 provides a compact account of our CCP vs. PCP equi-
librium findings under a fixed exchange-rate regime, i.e. with Ms ≡ M∗s for
41This latter equality does not, however, also mean that real consumption is equal in the
two countries, which will be true only under equal money growth rates in a given state of
nature se (recall Proposition 1).
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CCP PCP
NER Scs =
Ms
M∗s
6= 1 unless se SPs =
³
Ms
M∗s
´ 1
ϕ 6= 1 unless se
relative prices
foreign/home pCH = p
∗,C
F = 1
6=1 unless sez }| {
pPH,s =
³
p∗,PF,s
´−1
= SPs =
ToT (ToT )CH,s =
1
(ToT )∗,CF,s
= 1SCs
=
6=1 unless sez }| {
= (ToT )PH,s =
1
(ToT )∗,PF,s
RER = 1
(RER)CH,s
= (RER)∗,CF,s 6= 1 unless se (RER)PH = (RER)∗,PF = 1
consumption
relative cCs 6= c∗,Cs unless se cPs 6= c∗,Ps unless se
split-up
cCH,s
cCF,s
=
c∗,CF,s
c∗,CH,s
= 1,∀s 1 6= c
P
H,s
cPF,s
6= c
∗,P
F,s
c∗,PH,s
6= 1 unless se
aggregates cCH,s = c
C
F,s 6= c∗,CH,s = c∗,CF,s ,∀s cPH,s 6= cPF,s 6= c∗,PH,s 6= c∗,PF,s unless se
labor/leisure
employment nCs = n
∗,C
s ,∀s nPs 6= n∗,Ps unless se
leisure lCs = l
∗,C
s ,∀s lPs 6= l∗,Ps unless se
trade-to-output
by country (ft)CH = (ft)
∗,C
F = 1
6=1z }| {
(ft)PH,s 6=
6=1z }| {
(ft)∗,PF,s unless se
world 12 (ft)
C
H +
1
2 (ft)
∗,C
F = 1
1
2 (ft)
P
H,s +
1
2 (ft)
∗,P
F,s = 1,∀s
Table 1: Equilibrium Results under Float
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∀s ∈ S. It helps clarify in an explicit manner the parallels and divergencies
with regard to the corresponding float results in Table 1.
CCP PCP
NER SCs =
Ms
Ms = 1,∀s S
P
s =
³
Ms
Ms
´ 1
ϕ
= 1,∀s
relative prices
foreign/home same as under float pPH = p
∗,P
F = S
P =
ToT (ToT )CH = (ToT )
C
F = S
C = = (ToT )PH = (ToT )
P
F = 1
RER = (RER)CH = (RER)
C
F = 1 same as under float
consumption
relative cCs = c
∗,C
s ,∀s cPs = c∗,Ps ,∀s
split-up same as under float
cPH,s
cPF,s
=
c∗,PF,s
c∗,PH,s
= 1,∀s
aggregates cCH,s = c
C
F,s = c
∗,C
H,s = c
∗,C
F,s ,∀s cPH,s = cPF,s = c
∗,P
H,s = c
∗,P
F,s ,∀s
labor/leisure
employment same as under float nPs = n
∗,P
s ,∀s
leisure same as under float lPs = l
∗,P
s ,∀s
trade-to-output
by country same as under float (ft)PH = (ft)
P
F = 1
world same as under float same as under float
Table 2: Equilibrium Results under Peg
On the basis of these two comparative tables, we next discuss the impact of
alternative exchange rate-regimes on trade prices and flows, given CCP or PCP.
4.2 Relative Prices under Peg
As far as the key international prices are concerned, a peg makes a diﬀerence
with respect to a float in that it ensures all three relative prices we considered
— the foreign/domestic output price, the ToT and the RER — to be equal to
1, i.e. to the fixed NER (cf. tables 1 and 2) not only ex-ante (in expectation)
but also ex-post (in equilibrium) in any realized state. Consequently, Home
as well as Foreign agents perceive these prices in the same neutral way which
does not induce substitutions in consumption via pass-through and expenditure
switching. Under float and CCP (see Table 1), this is not generally the case
for the ToT and the RER, no matter that the relative price of foreign-produced
goods in terms of domestic goods is always predetermined at 1 (so that the
expenditure-switching channel is inoperative). Under float and PCP (see again
Table 1), it is not generally the case for this latter relative price (so that now
NER pass-through induces optimal expenditure switching) and for the ToT, no
matter that the equilibrium RER is always 1, due to PPP.
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4.3 Expected Trade Flows
Proposition 6 (Expected Trade Share) Under full symmetry and separable pref-
erences, the expected trade-to-output ratio in each of the countries is always 1,
no matter the particular price setting and exchange-rate regime modelled.
Under CCP, equations (32) and (34) we derived earlier showed that the
value of trade is equal to the value of output, irrespective of the particular state
of nature that has materialized. To put it diﬀerently, both trade and output
do vary in value across states, but under CCP when there is no consumption
switching this variation is in the same direction and proportion so that their
ratio always remains constant, at 1 under full symmetry and separable pref-
erences. Therefore, expected trade-to-output is 1 under CCP, given the above
assumptions:
E0
h
(ft)CH
i
= E0
h
(ft)CF
i
= E0 [1] = 1, s ∈ S. (36)
Taking expectations from the equilibrium trade share formulas, (33) and
(35), under PCP with float and full symmetry is shown in Appendix A to derive
the same result:
E0
h
(ft)PH,s
i
= 1 = E0
h
(ft)PF,s
i
, s ∈ S. (37)
We thus conclude that expected trade-to-output is 1 under PCP too.
To sum-up, our alternative assumptions on invoicing and monetary arrange-
ments are neutral to expected trade shares, the relevant measure to compare
them under uncertainty, as in our framework.42
However, there is one essential way, valid only under PCP, in which the
exchange-rate regime does matter for trade in our set-up. It is that a peg
eliminates — by preventing any exchange-rate pass-through on relative prices
and, hence, by shutting down the expenditure switching channel — the volatility
of trade in terms of output across states of nature. Comparing the trade share
formulas (33) and (35) makes it easy to see that a peg under PCP restores in
any s ∈ S the ex-post equality, typical under CCP with float, between nominal
trade and nominal output in each of the countries. This interesting parallel is
highlighted next.
Corollary 1 (Trade-Output Equalization under PCP with Peg) A fixed exchange-
rate regime, by maintaining relative money stock equilibrium in any state of
nature, guarantees under PCP — via the optimal consumption split-up channel
— equilibrium trade to be equal to output in both countries modelled.
Proof. Follows directly from the proofs of propositions 2 and 4.
Note that trade-output equalization obtains always under CCP even with
float,43 so a peg is in that case not needed to bring about such a result.
42Under full symmetry and separable preferences.
43Given full symmetry and separable preferences.
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Given the equal preference for Home and Foreign product brands in the
simple stochastic model of international trade we analyzed, there may thus be
some role for a peg in eliminating ex-post consumption switching under float
and, consequently, stabilizing the equilibrium trade-to-output in both countries.
But rough calculations similar to those in the proof of Proposition 4 (Impact of
Monetary Expansion) have indicated that there is a cost to such stabilization
in terms of some loss (not a big one, it is true) of world consumption relative to
a PCP with float. Since (slightly) reduced real world consumption implies, in
this framework, (slightly) increased world leisure, a deeper welfare analysis of
the set-up we considered requires an explicit specification of the utility function,
which we preferred to keep general for our purposes here, and thus goes beyond
the scope of the present study.
5 Concluding Comments
The objective of this paper was to analyze the implications of alternative price
setting in evaluating the eﬀects of the exchange-rate regime on international
trade. The recent NOEM modelling approach underlying much related research
has provided a modern toolkit to revisit this classic but still unresolved issue.
To study it within an appropriate framework, we essentially extended Bacchetta
and van Wincoop’s (2000 a) stochastic ”benchmark monetary model” based
on consumer’s currency pricing (CCP) to a producer’s currency pricing (PCP)
version as well.
Our analysis confirmed in a broader context that a peg does not necessarily
imply a higher trade share in output relative to a float, for any of the two iden-
tical countries or currency blocs modelled as well as for the world economy as a
whole. With full symmetry, only monetary shocks and separable but otherwise
very general utility, the exchange-rate regime does not matter for the expected
level of trade-to-output ratios across nations, irrespective of the assumed price
setting. This important result was explicitly derived from microfoundations and
formally proved within our purposefully kept simple analytical framework. We
also pointed out that once nominal rigidity is distinguished across open-economy
invoicing practices, a comparison of exchange-rate regimes is nevertheless mean-
ingful under PCP, although not CCP, in terms of volatility of relative prices
and, hence, national trade shares. More precisely, the equilibrium trade share
by country becomes volatile across states of nature under PCP, although it is
still constant at 1 for the world as a whole, just like in the CCP model version.
There is, thus, an eﬀect of a peg under PCP, absent under CCP, in stabilizing
across states of nature equilibrium trade-to-output in each of the economies at
its expected level of 1.
We identified the diﬀerence in the impact of exchange-rate regimes on na-
tional trade share variability as originating in the currency denomination of
transactions and, hence, the exchange-rate pass-through implied by our alterna-
tive price-setting assumptions. Consequently, the expenditure-switching chan-
nel functions well under (full) PCP but not at all under (full) CCP. We showed,
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in particular, that under both CCP and PCP relative real consumption is deter-
mined in equilibrium by the relative money stock, although in a diﬀerent way.
We also demonstrated that the optimal split-up of real consumption between
demand for domestic and foreign goods is 50 : 50 under CCP no matter the
state of nature, so any kind of monetary expansion — coordinated under peg
or unilateral under float — does not induce switching in consumption. Under
PCP, this optimal split-up depends instead on the relative money stock in the
realized state. Thus, a monetary expansion under float in one of the countries
results in a bias in both countries favoring consumption of the goods produced
in the expansionary country. Finally, we proved that under CCP equilibrium
output, employment and, ultimately, leisure (but not consumption) are always
the same across countries, whereas under PCP they are determined (as well as
consumption) by the relative money stock and are therefore not equal between
nations unless in the case of relative monetary equilibrium.
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A Proofs of Propositions
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1 (Relative Consumption)
Proof.
• Under CCP and full symmetry with separable preferences (recall that in
this case PCH = P
C
F = P
∗,C
H = P
∗,C
F and thus P
C = P ∗,C), relative real
consumption can be expressed as follows:
cCs
c∗,Cs
≡
cCH,s + c
C
F,s
c∗,CF,s + c
∗,C
H,s
=
1
2
³
PCH
PC
´−ϕ
Ms
PC +
1
2
³
PCF
PC
´−ϕ
Ms
PC
1
2
³
P∗,CF
P∗,C
´−ϕ M∗s
P∗,C +
1
2
³
P∗,CH
P∗,C
´−ϕ M∗s
P∗,C
=
=
³
PCH
PC
´−ϕ
Ms
PC³
P∗,CF
P∗,C
´−ϕ M∗s
P∗,C
=
Ms
M∗s
= SCs 6= 1 unless se ⊂ S;
• Under PCP and full symmetry with separable preferences (so that PPH =
P ∗,PF , P
P
F,s = S
P
s P
∗,P
F , P
∗,P
H,s =
PPH
SPs
and thus PPs = S
P
s ⇔ P ∗,Ps =
PPs
SPs
),
analogous reasoning derives relative real consumption to be:
cPs
c∗,Ps
≡
cPH,s + c
P
F,s
c∗,PF,s + c
∗,P
H,s
=
1
2
³
PPH
PPs
´−ϕ
Ms
PPs
+ 12
µ
PPF,s
PPs
¶−ϕ
Ms
PPs
1
2
³
P∗,PF
P∗,Ps
´−ϕ M∗s
P∗,Ps
+ 12
µ
P∗,PH,s
P∗,Ps
¶−ϕ
M∗s
P∗,Ps
=
=
1
2
³
PPH
PPs
´−ϕ
Ms
PPs
+ 12
³
SPs P
∗,P
F
PPs
´−ϕ
Ms
PPs
1
2
Ã
P∗,PF
PPs
SPs
!−ϕ
M∗s
PPs
SPs
+ 12
Ã PPH
SPs
PPs
SPs
!−ϕ
M∗s
PPs
SPs
=
=
1
2
³
PPH
PPs
´−ϕ
Ms
PPs
h
1 +
¡
SPs
¢−ϕi
1
2
³
P∗,PF
PPs
´−ϕ M∗s
PPs
h
(SPs )
−ϕ SPs + SPs
i =
=
Ms
M∗s
h
1 +
¡
SPs
¢−ϕih
(SPs )
−ϕ
+ 1
i
SPs
=
¡
SPs
¢ϕ 1
SPs
=
=
¡
SPs
¢ϕ−1
=
µ
Ms
M∗s
¶ϕ−1
ϕ
6= 1 unless se ⊂ S.
This completes our proof.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 2 (Consumption Switching)
Proof.
• Under CCP and full symmetry with separable preferences (PCH = PCF =
P ∗,CH = P
∗,C
F and P
C = P ∗,C), the optimal split-up of real consumption
between demand of domestic and foreign goods can be expressed as follows:
for Home:
cCH,s
cCF,s
=
1
2
³
PCH
PC
´−ϕ
Ms
PC
1
2
³
PCF
PC
´−ϕ
Ms
PC
= 1⇔ cCH,s = cCF,s for ∀s ∈ S,
for Foreign:
c∗,CF,s
c∗,CH,s
=
1
2
³
P∗,CF
P∗,C
´−ϕ M∗s
P∗,C
1
2
³
P∗,CH
P∗,C
´−ϕ M∗s
P∗,C
= 1⇔ c∗,CF,s = c
∗,C
H,s for ∀s ∈ S.
• Under PCP and full symmetry with separable preferences (PPH = P ∗,PF ,
PPF,s = S
P
s P
∗,P
F , P
∗,P
H,s =
PPH
SPs
and PPs = S
P
s P
∗,P
s ⇔ P ∗,Ps =
PPs
SPs
), analogous
reasoning derives the optimal split-up of real consumption to be:
for Home:
cPH,s
cPF,s
=
1
2
³
PPH
PPs
´−ϕ
Ms
PPs
1
2
³
SPs P
∗,P
F
PPs
´−ϕ
Ms
PPs
=
¡
SPs
¢ϕ
=
Ms
M∗s
6= 1 unless se ⊂ S,
for Foreign:
c∗,CF,s
c∗,CH,s
=
1
2
³
P∗,PF
P∗,Ps
´−ϕ M∗s
P∗,Ps
1
2
Ã PPH
SPs
P∗,Ps
!−ϕ
M∗s
P∗,Ps
=
¡
SPs
¢−ϕ
=
M∗s
Ms
6= 1 unless se ⊂ S.
This completes our proof.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3 (Relative Leisure)
Proof.
• Under CCP and full symmetry with separable preferences (PCH = PCF =
P ∗,CH = P
∗,C
F and P
C = P ∗,C), relative real output can be expressed as:
yCs
y∗,Cs
≡
cCH,s + c
∗,C
H,s
c∗,CF,s + c
C
F,s
=
1
2
³
PCH
PC
´−ϕ
Ms
PC +
1
2
³
P∗,CH
P∗,C
´−ϕ M∗s
P∗,C
1
2
³
P∗,CF
P∗,C
´−ϕ M∗s
P∗,C +
1
2
³
PCF
PC
´−ϕ
Ms
PC
=
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=1
2
³
PCH
PC
´−ϕ
1
PC (Ms +M
∗
s )
1
2
³
P∗,CF
P∗,C
´−ϕ
1
P∗,C (M
∗
s +Ms)
= 1⇔ yCs = y∗,Cs for ∀s ∈ S.
Consequently:
yCs
y∗,Cs
≡ n
C
s
n∗,Cs
≡ 1− l
C
s
1− l∗,Cs
= 1⇒ l
C
s
l∗,Cs
= 1⇔ lCs = l∗,Cs for ∀s ∈ S.
• Under PCP and full symmetry with separable preferences (PPH = P ∗,PF ,
PPF,s = S
P
s P
∗,P
F , P
∗,P
H,s =
PPH
SPs
and PPs = S
P
s P
∗,P
s ⇔ P ∗,Ps =
PPs
SPs
), analogous
reasoning derives relative real output to be:
yPs
y∗,Ps
≡
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H,s
c∗,PF,s + c
P
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=
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PPH
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¶ 1
ϕ
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6= 1 unless se ⊂ S.
Hence:
yPs
y∗,Ps
≡ n
P
s
n∗,Ps
≡ 1− l
P
s
1− l∗,Ps
=
Ms
M∗s
=
¡
SPs
¢−ϕ 6= 1 unless se ⊂ S ⇒
⇒ l
C
s
l∗,Cs
6= 1⇔ lCs 6= l∗,Cs unless se ⊂ S.
This completes our proof.
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 4 (Impact of Monetary Expan-
sion)
Proof. To evaluate and compare ex-post utility across countries following a
relative monetary expansion under float, we need to take account of the simul-
taneous eﬀects on relative real consumption and relative leisure. Assume at this
point that a higher positive (or a lower negative) money growth has occurred
in Home in a given state sH ∈ SH ⊂ S, so that
MsH
M∗sH
> 1.44
• Under CCP and full symmetry with separable preferences, we then obtain
directly from Proposition 1 that
cCsH
c∗,CsH
> 1⇔ cCsH > c
∗,C
sH , so the Home rep-
resentative household consumes more than the Foreign one in this state of
nature. From Proposition 3 we also know that relative leisure is indepen-
dent, under CCP, from money stocks, so
lCsH
l∗,CsH
= 1 ⇔ lCsH = l
∗,C
sH . Taking
account of both utility index components, namely real consumption and
leisure hours, we can conclude that the relative monetary expansion has
tilted relative ex-post utility in favor of the expansionary country.
• Under PCP and full symmetry with separable preferences, we obtain —
again from Proposition 1 — that
cPsH
c∗,PsH
> 1⇔ cPsH > c
∗,P
sH , so the Home rep-
resentative household consumes again more than the Foreign one. From
Proposition 3 we can see that, under PCP,
1−lsH
1−l∗sH
=
MsH
M∗sH
> 1, so
lsH
l∗sH
< 1,
with 0 < lsH < l
∗
sH < 1. We now have to know whether the relative gain
in real consumption in the expansionary economy is higher or lower than
the relative loss in leisure. This type of calculation depends qualitatively
on the magnitude of the relative monetary disequilibrium,
MsH
M∗sH
> 1, and
quantitatively on the degree of substitutability in consumption, ϕ > 1.
For our purposes here, we abstract from unrealistic relative monetary dis-
equilibria45 and focus on cases that are consistent with our sticky-price
set-up. It turns out that under PCP the gain of the Home representa-
tive household in consumption relative to the Foreign one is lower than
its simultaneous relative loss in leisure, when consumption and leisure are
separable and equally valued, as we assume for our purposes here.46 Under
PCP, therefore, Home residents are worse-oﬀ than Foreign ones in cross-
country utility terms following a Home relative monetary expansion. Let
us take as an illustrative example a (realistic) case where µsH = 4% and
44Of course, we would arrive at the same conclusions if we start from a symmetric state
of the world characterized by a Foreign relative monetary expansion sF ∈ SF ⊂ S, so that
MsF
M∗sF
< 1.
45Although we have computed such as well, to numerically verify that they do not change
our conclusions.
46And starting from an initial symmetric equilibrium with 8 hours of labor and 8 hours of
leisure (and 8 hours of sleep), so that n0 = n∗0 = l0 = l∗0 =
1
2
if our time endowment (less the
”optimum” of sleep) is normalized to 1, as in (3) (and as usual).
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µ∗sH = 2% so that
MsH
M∗sH
= 104102 = 1.0196 > 1. Furthermore, consider (as
being close to reality) a monopolistic markup of 10%, and thus a corre-
sponding parameter value of ϕ = 11. Using our model to perform such a
calculation,47 we find that the Home representative household consumes
1.0178 times (+1.78 percentage points) more than the Foreign one but
also works 1.0200 times more and so has 11.0200 = 0.9804 times (−1.96
percentage points) less leisure. Note, however, that given our choice of
parameter values above (or parameter regions, more generally) considered
as realistic under nominal rigidity, the magnitude of relative utility ef-
fects measured by the reported diﬀerence in terms of percentage points
(+1.78− 1.96 = −0.18) appears somewhat small to be easily perceptible,
and motivating indeed, in the optimizing behavior of the rational agents we
model. Another observation to make here is that a lower substitutabil-
ity exacerbates the gap between the relative consumption gain and the
relative leisure loss while a higher substitutability, by contrast, reduces
it.48 In the limit, when ϕ → ∞ and competition is perfect, one could
infer form our numerical examples that the gain in relative consumption
following a domestic monetary expansion under float and PCP will be ex-
actly oﬀset by the loss in relative leisure, in percentage terms, and ex-post
cross-country utility will remain unchanged. Thus PCP, and hence PPP,
with perfect competition would act as a risk-sharing device between the
two nations we model, a finding that has been pointed out in other NOEM
papers as well.
This completes our proof.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5 (World Trade Share)
Proof.
• Under CCP, Home nominal trade is always equal to Home nominal output
so that the Home trade share in output is constant at 1, irrespective of
the state of nature that has materialized. The same is true for Foreign,
and as a consequence (ft)∗,CF = 1 = (ft)
C
H so that
1
2 (ft)
C
H+
1
2 (ft)
∗,C
F = 1,
for ∀s ∈ S.
• Under PCP, by contrast, both these trade-to-output ratios are state-dependent
and generally not equal to each other and to 1: 1 6= (ft)PH,s 6= (ft)∗,PF,s 6= 1
unless se ⊂ S. However due to symmetry, the Home and Foreign trade
shares in GDP are complementary in the sense that in any state of nature
s ∈ S they sum to 2:
47The details are available upon request.
48The details of the similar computations we performed with ϕ = 2 and ϕ = 101 (as well as
with other values for the relative monetary disequilibrium) are also available upon request.
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(ft)PH,s + (ft)
∗,P
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2
(SPs )
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=
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(1−ϕ)+
2
¡
SPs
¢1−ϕ
1 + (SPs )
(1−ϕ) =
=
2 + 2
¡
SPs
¢1−ϕ
1 + (SPs )
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2
h
1 +
¡
SPs
¢1−ϕi
1 + (SPs )
(1−ϕ) = 2
Thus, (equally-weighted) world trade equals world output in any state of
nature s ∈ S:
1
2
(ft)PH,s +
1
2
(ft)∗,PF,s = 1, for ∀s ∈ S.
This completes our proof.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6 (Expected Trade Share)
Proof. 49 Start by recalling our result in (33):
(ft)PH,s =
2
1 + (SPs )
ϕ−1 =
2
1 +
h
Ms
M∗s
iϕ−1
ϕ
.
Since we have assumed a jointly symmetric distribution of money shocks,
there are three kinds of state of nature: (i) Ms = M∗s (hence (ft)
P
H,s = 1), (ii)
Ms > M∗s , and (iii) Ms < M
∗
s . So the expected trade share is:
E0
h
(ft)PH,s
i
= 1−
X
s, MsM∗s >1
Pr (s)−
X
s0,
Ms0
M∗s0
<1
Pr (s0)
+
X
s, MsM∗s >1
Pr (s)
2
1 +
h
Ms
M∗s
iϕ−1
ϕ
+
X
s0,
Ms0
M∗s0
<1
Pr (s0)
2
1 +
h
Ms0
M∗s0
iϕ−1
ϕ
,
where 1 −
P
s, MsM∗s >1
Pr (s) −
P
s0,
Ms0
M∗s0
<1
Pr (s0) is the total probability of
the states where M = M∗. Symmetry: for each state s where MsM∗s > 1 there
49 I am grateful to Cédric Tille for suggesting to compress my analogous, but longer, proof
into the elegant form below.
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is exactly one mirror state s0 where Ms0M∗s0
=
h
Ms
M∗s
i−1
, with Pr (s) = Pr (s0).
Therefore we write:
E0
h
(ft)PH,s
i
= 1− 2
X
s, MsM∗s >1
Pr (s) +
X
s, MsM∗s >1
Pr (s)


2
1 +
h
Ms
M∗s
iϕ−1
ϕ
+
2
1 +
h
Ms
M∗s
i−ϕ−1ϕ


= 1− 2
X
s, MsM∗s >1
Pr (s) + 2
X
s, MsM∗s >1
Pr (s)


1
1 +
h
Ms
M∗s
iϕ−1
ϕ
+
h
Ms
M∗s
iϕ−1
ϕ
1 +
h
Ms
M∗s
iϕ−1
ϕ


= 1− 2
X
s, MsM∗s >1
Pr (s) + 2
X
s, MsM∗s >1
Pr (s)
= 1
The same logic applies to the Foreign expected trade-to-output ratio, E0
h
(ft)P,∗F,s
i
,for
no matter what distribution of (money) shocks provided that it is jointly sym-
metric.
This completes our proof.
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